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the government could not take his water rights without compensation,
the injunction against him was too broad, and civil penalties should
not have been assessed. The court affirmed.
Murrison's water rights dated back to 1870-1912. He argued that
his water right predated the Code and was therefore exempt from its
requirements. The court of appeals found, however, that water rights
predating the Code are not exempt from regulation. It is within the
state's police power to create reasonable regulations to protect the
wildlife of the state.
Murrison argued he was not diverting new water but rather
maintaining his waterworks and was exempt from the Code. The court
found that Murrison's action was not maintenance, but rather a
substantial diversion that required DFG notification.
Murrison also argued that the state could not take his water right
without just compensation. The court found that Murrison's takings
claim was not ripe. Murrison did not bring a takings claim at the trial
court level and was not restricted from making the claim on appeal.
The court stated, however, that they found no restrictions on
Murrison's right to divert water. Murrison was only required to notify
the DFG of his diversion. Had Murrison given notice, the DFG may
have approved the diversion without any restrictions.
Murrison claimed the trial court should not have assessed a civil
penalty. The court found the Code allows penalties in excess of what
Murrison received and justified the penalty based on Murrison's
actions coupled with the nature of the diversion and damages.
Colleen M. Cooley
Hartwell Corp. v. Santamaria, 38 P.3d 1098 (Cal. 2002) (holding
public utility commission's jurisdiction does not extend to suits against
non-regulated utilities and industries, nor to suits alleging violations of
state and federal water-quality standards).
Multiple consumers brought actions in two superior courts against
regulated water providers ("RWPs"), non-regulated water providers
("NRWPs"), and multiple industrial companies for damages and
injunctive relief from alleged water contamination.
The parties
claimed that the water utilities provided them unsafe drinking water
causing death, personal injury, and property damage. The California
Court of Appeals held one of the two superior courts erred: (1) in
staying the proceedings instead of ruling on the merits; (2) by failing
to grant the RWPs' Public Utilities Code section 1759 motion to
dismiss; and (3) by failing to deny the industrial companies' and the
NRWPs' section 1759 motions to dismiss. The appeals court also held
the second superior court was correct in granting the RWPs' motion to
dismiss and denying the NRWPs' and the industrial companies'
motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court of California granted
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petitions for review filed by the RWPs, the NRWPs, the industrial
companies, and the consumers.
The Supreme Court held while section 1759 preempts claims
alleging insufficient water regulation standards, it does not preempt
damage claims against RWPs alleging violations of federal and state
drinking water standards, nor does it preempt any claims against
unregulated entities, specifically the NRWPs and the industrial
companies.
The court began its analysis with a background of the jurisdiction
of the public utility commissions ("PUC"), and the effects section 1759
had on the PUC's jurisdiction and the industrial companies.
Normally, no court except an appeals court or a supreme court has
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any PUC order or
decision. However, Public Utilities Code section 2106 creates a cause
of action in any court for damages resulting from a public utility's
unlawful act or neglect of a positive duty. The court resolved the
inherent conflict between these two sections by applying the three-part
test from San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court ("Covalt"). This
conjunctive test bars an action in superior court if: (1) the PUC had
authority to set and enforce regulatory standards; (2) the PUC
exercised that authority; and (3) the superior court action would
hinder or interfere with the PUC's exercise of regulatory authority.
The court then analyzed section 1579's effect on the claims against
the RWPs. The court found all actions against the RWPs passed the
first Covalt prong. The PUC had authority because: (1) it regulated
public health and safety through public utilities, and therefore
regulated water quality; (2) it regulated rates and set budgets for water
treatment, and therefore water quality; and (3) it had statutory
authority to set water quality standards not inconsistent with state
standards, which the court reasoned to mean the PUC could set any
standard above state levels which it deemed appropriate.
The court further found all actions against the RWPs passed the
second Covalt prong because the PUC exercised its authority. The
PUC exercised its authority in a number of ways, including: regulating
rates; issuing guidelines for water quality improvement projects; and
issuing a decision that conforming to drinking water standards would
require investment of $50 million to $200 million over several years.
Finally, the court found some of the consumers' actions passed the
third Covalt prong, while others did not. The actions that did not pass
were those that asserted the water quality standards were inherently
faulty. The court reasoned that superior court review of the water
quality standards themselves would hinder and interfere with the
PUC's exercise of regulatory authority by directly reviewing an order
or decision of the PUC. Therefore, section 1759 preempted claims
alleging faulty standards. However, the court found section 1759 did
not preempt claims that asserted faulty compliance with existing
standards. The court reasoned the PUC only had mechanisms for
prospective remedial programs, but no mechanism by which
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consumers could obtain relief for past violations. Since the PUC had
no jurisdiction to hear suits seeking damages for faulty compliance,
section 1759 did not bar consumers' suits based on such damages
because there was no direct review, reversal, correction, or annulment
of the PUC's order or decision. The court concluded section 1759 did
not bar those claims based solely on faulty compliance.
The court then disposed of consumers' claim for injunctive relief
to provide clean water. The court reasoned an injunction, based on a
finding different from that of the PUC, would clearly conflict with the
PUC decision-making and regulatory functions. The court contrasted
an injunction as a form of prospective remedial relief with ajury award
of damages. The court concluded section 1759 preempted injunctive
relief.
The court then turned its attention to the NRWPs and the
industrial companies. The NRWPs and industrial companies argued
three points. First, they argued section 1759 encompassed both utility
and nonutility parties. Second, that section 1759 and Covalt applied
broadly to subject matters and issues before the PUC, not just to
actions against regulated utilities. Finally, they argued some of the
RWPs' water was from the same supply as the NWRPs. Thus a jury
award undermined the PUC's report that the drinking water was safe
by directly reviewing, reversing, correcting, or annulling the PUC's
decision.
The court dismissed the first argument by reasoning the
California Constitution restricts the PUC's duties to regulated utilities.
Therefore, suits against unregulated utilities and non-utilities could
not possibly interfere with the PUC's official regulatory duties. The
court dismissed the second argument by noting the NRWPs and the
industrial companies cited no case law to support their argument. The
court noted the NRWPs and industrial companies cited isolated
statements from cases in an attempt to bolster their position. The
court read the statements within the broader context of the cases and
found the statements actually supported the position that section 1759
and Covalt applied only to cases against regulated utilities. The court
dismissed the third argument by noting the PUC had no jurisdiction to
hear cases against NRWPs. Therefore, the PUC's jurisdiction would
suffer no injury if the superior court addressed the case. Moreover, if
the superior court had no jurisdiction, the cases would have no forum
at all.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on the
preemption issues only, and affirmed the remainder of the appellate
decision. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.
James Parrot

